Philosophy Research on Time and Space – Update 3 on Time

In my first blog I explained the difference between time A-series and B-series, which Is brought up by McTaggart. Upon bringing this distinction, McTaggart argues that the A-series of time involves contradiction. According to him, tensed properties, i.e. pastness, presentness, and futureness, are mutually exclusive. No event can possibly have more than one tensed property. However, in A-series of time, any event in time would have all three tensed properties. For example, I being born had the property of futureness before I was born, have the property of presentness at the moment I was born, and have the property of pastness ever since. This seems contradictory to McTaggart.

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Philosophy Research on Time and Space – Update 2 on Space

Historical and current research on space has largely fallen on the relationship between objects and space, i.e. whether space is dependent on objects (there’s no space if there’s no object) or objects are dependent on space (there’s no object if there’s no space). Different from the concept of time, we cannot imagine anything without imagining it in space, and this gives space a special status.  Philosophy of science has done most of the work in contemporary philosophy, and that is not what my interest falls on. Therefore, my interest is primarily not about the relationship between objects and space, but the question: “what does it mean to be extended in space?”

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